

TWO ONTOLOGIES: TWO APPROACHES

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"Ist die Einteilung Gott und die Welt zulässig?"¹

— Immanuel Kant

I. Idealtypical Preview

To comprehend the status of the world, in which we are immersed and which we breathe in, it posits the hermeneutical circle because no one can approach the universe apart from his inevitable embedding in it. Thus, the world's status must be analysed within the terrestrial boundaries. Methodologically, the concept of the world is an ideal type

¹ Immanuel Kant, "Opus postumum," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 21 (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1936), 5 [I, I, 3].

in the Weberian sense, so it evades a precise definition, simultaneously conditioning human cognition. In the present survey ontologies of old Schelling and of Hegel are scrutinised in connection with the approaches to the world which they entail. Furthermore, Schelling's and Hegel's circumscription of the universe ought to be examined with reference to the ancient Greek philosophy and to the thinkers, who had an impact upon the German idealism, such as Eriugena and Spinoza.

In the 19th century the Protestant theology of the German-speaking world was primarily shaped by the heritage of Kant, Hegel and Schleiermacher. The legacy of old Schelling was absorbed late, predominantly by Paul Tillich.² Formally, neither Hegel's nor Schelling's systems must be adapted to the Protestant theology because they were classmates who graduated in this discipline from the same university and were fully qualified Protestant theologians. Schelling's ultimate philosophical project (called the philosophy of revelation) for various reasons discouraged scholars, yet not all of them.³

² Paul Tillich, *Die religionsgeschichtliche Konstruktion in Schellings positiver Philosophie: Ihre Voraussetzungen und Prinzipien* (Breslau: Fleischman, 1910); Tillich, *Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1912); Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1-3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963).

³ Edward Allen Beach, *The Potencies of God(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Hubert Beckers, *Über die Bedeutung der Schelling'schen Metaphysik: Ein Beitrag zum tiefen Verständnis der Potenzen- oder Prinzipienlehre Schellings* (München: Verlag der königlichen Akademie, 1861); Thomas Buchheim, *Eins von Allem: Die Selbstbescheidung des Idealismus in Schellings Spätphilosophie* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1992); Hans Czuma, *Der philosophische Standpunkt in Schellings Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung* (Innsbruck: Österreichische Kommissionsbuchhandlung, 1969); Johann Eduard Erdmann, *Über Schelling namentlich seine negative Philosophie* (Halle: Schmidt, 1857); Albert Franz, *Philosophische Religion: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Grundlegungsproblemen der Spätphilosophie F. W. J. Schellings* (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1992); Horst Fuhrmans, *Schellings letzte Philosophie: Die negative und positive Philosophie im Einsatz des Spätidealismus* (Berlin: Junker and Dünhaupt, 1940); Markus Gabriel, *Der Mensch im Mythos: Untersuchungen über Ontotheologie, Anthropologie und Selbstbewusstseinsgeschichte in Schellings Philosophie der Mythologie* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006); Klaus Hemmerle, *Gott und das Denken nach Schellings Spätphilosophie* (Freiburg: Herder, 1968); Walter Kasper, *Das Absolute in der Geschichte: Philosophie und Theologie der Geschichte in der Spätphilosophie Schellings* (Mainz:

Firstly, in contradistinction to Hegel, Schelling frequently modified his views and did not offer any accessible exposition of his mature thought. Secondly, in his lectures⁴ Schelling interwove the original philosophical arguments with the descriptive theological disquisitions so that the core might vanish into an ordinary discourse.

The literature both on Schelling⁵ and on Hegel⁶ is vast, while the sphere of their lasting influence – immense (e.g. Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Whitehead, Adorno). Moreover, their legacies are constantly actualized,

Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1965); Dietrich Korsch, *Der Grund der Freiheit: Eine Untersuchung zur Problemgeschichte der positiven Philosophie und zur Systemfunktion des Christentums im Spätwerk F. W. J. Schellings* (München: Kaiser, 1980); Josef Kreiml, *Die Wirklichkeit Gottes: Eine Untersuchung über die Metaphysik und die Religionsphilosophie des späten Schelling* (Regensburg: Roderer, 1989); Malte Dominik Krüger, *Göttliche Freiheit: Die Trinitätslehre in Schellings Spätphilosophie* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Frank Meier, *Transzendenz der Vernunft und Wirklichkeit Gottes: Eine Untersuchung zur philosophischen Gotteslehre in F. W. J. Schellings Spätphilosophie* (Regensburg: Pustet, 2004); Adolf Planck, *Schellings nachgelassene Werke und ihre Bedeutung für Philosophie und Theologie: Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis und zur Beurteilung derselben* (Erlangen: Bläsing, 1858); Heinrich Schreitmüller, *Das Leben Gottes in Schellings Philosophie der Offenbarung* (Landshut: Solanushaus, 1936); Daniel Sollberger, *Metaphysik und Invention: Die Wirklichkeit in den Suchbewegungen negativen und positiven Denkens in F. W. J. Schellings Spätphilosophie* (Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 1996); Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck, *Mythos und Logos: Interpretationen zu Schellings Philosophie der Mythologie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969); John Elbert Wilson, *Schellings Mythologie: Zur Auslegung der Philosophie der Mythologie und der Offenbarung* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1993).

⁴ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/1-4 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1856-1858).

⁵ Cf. the partial bibliographies: Johannes Jost, ed., *F. W. J. von Schelling: Bibliographie der Schriften von ihm und über ihn* (Bonn: Cohen, 1927); Guido Schneeberger, ed., *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling: Eine Bibliographie* (Bern: Francke, 1954); Kurt Appel, *Zeit und Gott: Mythos und Logos der Zeit im Anschluss an Hegel und Schelling* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008); Otto Braun, *Hinauf zum Idealismus: Schelling-Studien* (Leipzig: Eckardt, 1908); Christian Danz, *Die philosophische Christologie F. W. J. Schellings* (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1996); Manfred Frank, *Der unendliche Mangel an Sein: Schellings Hegelkritik und die Anfänge der Marxschen Dialektik* (München: Fink, 1992); Theodor Hoppe, *Die Philosophie Schellings und ihr Verhältnis zum Christentum* (Rostock: Boldt, 1875); John Watson, *Schelling's Transcendental Idealism: A Critical Exposition* (Chicago: Griggs, 1882).

⁶ Cf. the partial bibliography: Kurt Steinhauer, ed., *Hegel Bibliography: Background Material on the International Reception of Hegel within the Context of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1-2/2 (München: Saur, 1980-1998).

reinterpreted and discussed⁷ with a particular reference to their impact upon the modern theories of culture, of language, of art, of symbol and myth, of society and politics, of law, of science, and of historicity as well as in view of their contribution to the contemporary hermeneutics and anthropology. Therefore, the present paper is focused on the reconstruction of their diverse ontologies, which necessitated their divergent approaches to the world, from the primary sources.

II. The Ancient Greek Philosophy versus the World

All schools of the ancient Greek philosophy rejected an allegiance to the world and its institutions assuming that it would bring the virtue (recognised as a genuine aim of life) to naught. This was true even of the Epicureanism, which advocated the materialism in physics, and of the Stoicism, which taught that the divine, cosmic Logos permeates and animates the matter. Thus, the ancient Greek philosophy commonly considered the worldliness and the corporeality as an impediment to a dream life which ought to be devoid of the anxiety and suffering characteristic of the terrestrial, material existence. Since no one can divest himself of the body and no one can separate himself from the earthly institutions, the said philosophy postulated a mental indifference to the tangible and fleeting realm.

⁷ Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman, ed., *The New Schelling* (London and New York: Continuum, 2004); Jason M. Wirth, ed., *Schelling Now: Contemporary Readings* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Frederick C. Beiser, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Montserrat Herrero, ed., *G. W. F. Hegel Contemporary Readings: The Presence of Hegel's Philosophy in the Current Philosophical Debates* (Hildesheim and New York: Olms, 2011); Hans Küng, *Menschwerdung Gottes: Eine Einführung in Hegels theologisches Denken als Prolegomena zu einer künftigen Christologie* (Freiburg: Herder, 1970); Robert Stern, ed., *G. W. F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1-4 (London: Routledge, 1993).

The Platonism and the Neoplatonism undermined the world's status for ontological reasons. Although Plato contrasted the perfect and eternal ideas with their imperfect and transient imprints on the matter, he did not recognise the corporeal world as absolutely evil or abominable. Since the existing world was formed in the image of the ideal patterns, in spite of its deficiency (caused by the process of imprinting) the universe to a degree conforms to the prototype thereof. Moreover, in Plato's opinion the actual world, though it constantly alters, will not perish completely. The Neoplatonism amplified the Platonic concept of metempsychosis and constructed the system of emanation. Thus, by the intellectual enlightenment an individual soul may be liberated from the necessity of transmigration and may return to its primordial origin that is the One.

In the Neoplatonic ontological system all beings derive from the One that is absolutely perfect. Consequently, the more perfect entities give birth to the less perfect so that all beings are links in the chain. Thus, the corporeal world, though it was indirectly emanated from the One, fell away from the Absolute. Therefore, the universe is an exile for the souls that originate from the ideal realm and that yearn to come back to their haven. The Neoplatonism maintained that the dwelling of the soul in the body is a result of its fall. As certain souls were enchanted by the matter and succumbed to the corporeal deception, they deviated from the One.

According to this schema the world is finally to be dissolved because all, that departed from the One, should return to its source, when the ideal germs of all beings will be purged of their corporeal contamination and when the perennial ideas will no longer be intertwined with the lethal matter. In the Neoplatonism the emanation means the deterioration of the being and the world's emergence is equal to the corruption thereof because the universe comes true by falling from the One. Therefore, the world's finitude cannot be accepted. The universe must disperse into the One and man must be transformed into the Absolute (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ). A claim, that every

mythology either explicitly or implicitly presupposes the concept of the world's deviation and dissipation typical of the Neoplatonism, seems unwarranted. For instance, 《千字文》 takes the existence of the universe for granted (cf. 天地玄黃 宇宙洪荒) and *ex silentio* assumes that the universe endures forever.

The fact, that the Neoplatonists treasured the Greco-Roman folk religion and ardently worshipped the celestial bodies (e.g. the Moon),⁸ did not prove their devotion to the nature because these phenomena were treated as a bridge between the material world and the realm of ideas.⁹ Origen, who was initiated into the Middle Platonism by Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus' tutor, mentioned that the celestial bodies appear less corporeal for they are composed of an ether.¹⁰

III. An Old Tale Revived by Schelling

In his philosophy of revelation Schelling outlined his mature ontological schema¹¹ founded on what unconditionally exists (*das unbedingt Existierende*) namely on the monad proper (μονάς). The latter term was employed by Pythagoras who recognised the monad as the principle of the universe (ἀρχή τῶν ἀπάντων).¹² For Schelling,

⁸ Marinus Neapolitanus, *Vita Procli*, ed. Jean Francois Boissonade (Leipzig: Weigel, 1814), 9-10 [α].

⁹ Plotinus, "Enneades," in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, ed. Friedrich Creuzer (Oxford: E Typographeo Academico, 1835), 183-85 [II, I]; *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, ed. Friedrich Creuzer (Oxford: E Typographeo Academico, 1835), 898-900 [V, II].

¹⁰ Origenes, "Περὶ ἀρχῶν interprete Rufino Aquileiensi," in *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Graeca*, vol. 11, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1857), 174 [I, VII, 5].

¹¹ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Andere Deduktion der Prinzipien der positiven Philosophie," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/4 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1858), 337-56.

¹² Diogenes Laertius, "Pythagoras," in *De clarorum philosophorum vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus*, ed. Anton Westermann and Carel Gabriel Cobet (Paris: Didot, 1862), 210 [VIII, 1, 25]. Later, Leibniz gave prominence to the concept of the monad.

the monad proper is the immemorial being (*das unvordenkliche Sein*) prior to any thinking (Denken) and it conceals the potency to exist (*potentia existendi, das Seinkönnende*). The Schellingian "potency" (*Potenz*) is affiliated to the Aristotelian δύναμις. This potency is by its nature indeterminate (*das Unbestimmte*) and boundless (*das Unbegrenzte*) as τὸ ἄπειρον¹³ known from the ancient Greek philosophy.¹⁴

Schelling defined God as the necessary nature (*natura necessaria*) in the sense that he exists not only potentially but also necessarily. For him, the world is a transient, evanescent phenomenon evoked by the suspension (*Suspension*) of God's necessary being and terminated by the restoration (*Wiederherstellung*) of this being. Schelling argued that the immemorial being must be removed to make space (*Raum*) for the process of the creation. In his view, since the world emerges due to this vacated space, the category of space is the *a priori* form¹⁵ common to any finite existence. The suspension is aimed at bringing about a new being different from God which replaces the necessary divine being. The Schellingian concept of the suspension resembles the Lurianic self-contraction (םצמ צרם) of the Infinite One by which a space necessary for the emerging world is made.

To avoid confusion, Schelling explained that the universe stems not from the suspension of God's essence (*Wesen*) but from the suspension of the act (*actus*) of the necessary divine existence providing that the term "actus" corresponds to the Aristotelian ἐνέργεια (cf. *Metaphysics*, IX).¹⁶ According to Schelling, by the

¹³ Diogenes Laertius, "Anaximander," in *De clarorum philosophorum vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus*, ed. Westermann and Cobet, 33 [II, 1, 1].

¹⁴ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Elfte Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/3 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1858), 223-39.

¹⁵ An allusion to time and space as to the Kantian "forms of perception" (*Anschauungsformen*).

¹⁶ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Vierundzwanzigste Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/1 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1856), 562.

abolition (*Aufhebung*) of the said act (*actus*) the divine essence, which in itself can never be abolished (*das Unaufhebliche*), is elevated within itself (*in sich selbst erhöht wird*). Thus, what exists by itself (*das Seiende selbst*) cannot be lost or divested of. It remains unshaken.

To rebut the Hegelian circumscription of the world's ontological status, Schelling clarified that God does not externalise himself (*sich entäußern*) to the universe¹⁷ but as the Creator he soars within himself (*erhebt sich in sich selbst*) and submerges in his own divinity. In his opinion, God externalises himself only as far as his immemorial being is concerned. Consequently, while God empties himself of his immemorial being, he establishes the existence, which is distinct from him and which is beyond him, in order to revert to himself. For Schelling, the alternative is either to confess the universe as the emanation of the pure divinity (as Hegel did) or to perceive the world's status as "in-between" (i.e. between the suspension of the immemorial being and the termination of the suspension).¹⁸

Speaking of a future destiny of the world, Schelling minded his words.¹⁹ For him, only due to the suspension of the divine being (*das göttliche Sein*) the world could surface in place of the said being. Thus, the universe is extra-divine (*aussergöttlich*) and can be defined as what is extra-divine (*das Aussergöttliche*). Schelling attempted to differentiate between *ausser* in the sense of *extra* and *ausser* in the sense of *praeter* but philologically the semantic fields of these Latin prepositions are overlapping. Perhaps, he contrasted *extra* as

¹⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Fünfte Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/3, 91; Schelling, "Fünfunddreissigste Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/4 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1858), 279-93.

¹⁸ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Vierzehnte Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/3, 292-93.

¹⁹ Schelling, "Fünfte Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/2 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1857), 80-107; Schelling, "Dreizehnte Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/3, 262-90; Schelling, "Sechszwanzigste Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/4, 51-73.

"beyond" with *praeter* as "except," as Kant did.²⁰ Schelling contended that although in the creation (*Schöpfung*)²¹ God goes above his own immemorial being, the creature is still enveloped in him and in this sense the creation is immanent.²²

Consequently, the world is begotten out of the divine being by the suspension of its act (*actus*), which Schelling classified as a process of a mysterious theogony. He deemed this suspension temporary because ultimately the suspended divine being will be reinstated. The termination of the said suspension implies that the world naturally dissolves because it loses its space to exist namely the ontological concession to its existence. Thus, what is extra-divine (to wit the universe) will be abolished and assimilated by what exists by itself (*das Seiende selbst*). Once Schelling suggested that in the process of the assimilation the extra-divine is internally deified but cannot be absorbed into the divinity because God does not undo what he did setting the world beyond himself.²³

Schelling interpreted Christ as a symbol of the being that temporarily goes beyond what exists by itself (*das Seiende selbst*) namely that becomes extra-divine for a while.²⁴ In this respect Christ symbolises the universe as it is alienated from what exists by itself (*das Seiende selbst*) and as it is again drawn into the source of all being. To juxtapose Schelling's categories with the biblical concepts (such as the creation, fall, incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, last judgement), it is of no avail because he did not presume a correspondence between

²⁰ Kant, "Opus postumum," 66 [I, V, 3].

²¹ Schelling adopted the term "creation" though he did not invest it with the biblical meaning.

²² Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Sechzehnte Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/3, 337-54.

²³ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Sechste Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/2 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1857), 108-31.

²⁴ Schelling, "Sechszwanzigste Vorlesung," 51-73.

the Scripture and his philosophy of revelation which according to him is entitled to utilise biblical concepts as vivid pictures of abstract philosophical truths.²⁵

Therefore, certain statements of Schelling sound strange from the theological point of view. For instance, Schelling announced that as the extra-divine (*ausser-göttlich*) being subsides, the Son ceases to be aside from (*ausser*) the Father and immerses in the very Godhead from which he originates.²⁶ According to Schelling, the Son is insulated from the Father due to the extra-divinity of the Logos. As the alienation is retracted and the Son deprives himself of his extra-divinity, the trinitarian distinction in the former sense fades out. No cause, no effect (*cessante cause cessat effectus*). Thus, any existence external to God (*ausser-göttlich*) is possible only by virtue of God's self-withdrawal that is transitory.

Lecturing on the world's status, Schelling alluded to and disapproved²⁷ Hegel's statement that "God could not be God without the world."²⁸ For Hegel, the universe is the Absolute that negated itself in pursuit of self-knowledge and the corporeality is anchored to the ontological texture of the dialectical process (*idea est synthesis infiniti et finiti*),²⁹ whereas to Schelling the world appears elusive owing to its origin in the space released by God for a moment.

²⁵ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Erste Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/1, 3-25.

²⁶ Schelling, "Sechszwanzigste Vorlesung," 51-96; Schelling, "Dreissigste Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/4, 152-75.

²⁷ Schelling, "Fünfte Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/3, 91; Schelling, "Vierzehnte Vorlesung," 291-92.

²⁸ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 11 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1832), 122 [I, B, c]: "Ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott." Schelling, "Vierzehnte Vorlesung," 291: "Gott ist nicht Gott ohne die Welt."

²⁹ Karl Rosenkranz, "Habitationsdisputation am 27. August 1801," in *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1844), 158 [VI].

Schelling described a difference between his cosmogony and Hegel's circumscription of the world. Schelling aptly attributed to Hegel the statement that God externalises himself (*sich entäussern*) to the universe and resolves himself into to the world by his own negation. Besides, Schelling noticed that Hegel not only engaged the Absolute in the dialectical process but also identified this process as God. On the contrary, Schelling isolated God from the world's origin in the sense that the universe comes out of the space which God disposed of for that purpose and which is therefore empty of God.

For Schelling, philosophy as such is rooted in what is prior to the being (*vor dem Sein*) namely in what is the nothingness as compared to what is to emerge afterwards.³⁰ Thus, philosophy stems not from what is already existing (*das schon Seiende*) but from what is to be (*das was sein wird*). Furthermore, Schelling assumed that the pre-existence, from which philosophy originates, is tantamount to God.³¹ Since God is what is unconditional (*das Unbedingte*), his existence cannot be proven scientifically but must be demonstrated. This happens as God unfolds himself by means of the universe.

IV. The World Regained by Hegel

The Hegelianism was built as a system and should be viewed this way. To understand the world's status in Hegel's philosophy, it is necessary to scrutinise the foundations thereof. Hegel extolled³²

³⁰ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Zehnte Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/3, 204-7.

³¹ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. I/7 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1860), 423-24 [I].

³² Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie," in *Werke*, vol. 13 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1833), 332-37 [I, I, I, D, 1].

Heraclitus of Ephesus for his dynamic and dialectical (contradictory) concept of the being (cf. the differentiation – unification schema) and for his claim of the identity of the existence and non-existence (nothingness).³³ These axioms determined the entire Hegelian ontology.

Hegel redefined the concept of the idea which for him is a fusion (processual unity) of the infinity and the finitude, of the immateriality and the materiality, of the intangible and the tangible, of the internality and the externality, of the subjectivity and the objectivity, of the notion and the reality, of the identity and the difference.³⁴ Thus, the idea is the aggregate of the life, perception and knowledge. The idea is even its own implementation and fulfilment, and is never void of the reality.

Such a comprehension of the idea defied the traditional circumscription thereof rooted in various streams of the Platonism but it passed unnoticed except by Schelling who restated Hegel's formula.³⁵ In fact, Plato criticised Heraclitus' coincidence of the opposites arguing that unless the opposition subsides, the opposites cannot coincide.³⁶ For Plato, things that differ from each other, cannot be unified as long as they are diverse, so there is no harmony

³³ Diogenes Laertius, "Heraclitus," in *De clarorum philosophorum vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus*, ed. Anton Westermann and Carel Gabriel Cobet (Paris: Didot, 1862), 228 [IX, 1, 8]; Plato, "Symposium," in *Opera omnia*, vol. I/3, ed. Gottfried Stallbaum (Gotha and Erfurt: Hennings, 1836), 119-20 [XII, 187]; Hermann Diels, ed., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1906), 54-86 [12].

³⁴ Rosenkranz, "Habitationsdisputation am 27. August 1801," 158 [VI]; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Logik," in *Werke*, vol. 18 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1840), 94 [§ 6], 120 [§ 104-105]; Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," in *Werke*, vol. 6 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1843), 385-91 [§ 213-215]; Hegel, "Philosophische Enzyklopädie," in *Werke*, vol. 18, 166 [§ 84]; Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," 107-16 [I, B, c]; Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1832), 169-77 [III, B].

³⁵ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Philosophie der Kunst," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. I/5 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1859), 455 [§ 53].

³⁶ Plato, "Symposium," 119-20 [XII, 187].

composed of the opposites. Plato presumed that a difference impedes an agreement and resorted to music in order to demonstrate that the opposite sounds cannot be harmonised unless they lose their distinctiveness preventing an overall harmony.

On that account, irrespective of its name (idealism) the Hegelian philosophy broke off with the Platonism. Hegel reaffirmed that "all philosophy exists in ideas" (*philosophia omnis est in ideis*) but invested the term "idea" with a completely new meaning (*idea est synthesis infiniti et finiti*).³⁷ Hegel's union of the opposites was echoed in his assertion that the matter and the form (in the Aristotelian sense) reciprocally beget one another.³⁸ A thought, that the matter could not only be passive but also proactive, was undoubtedly innovative.

In the Hegelianism the dynamic and contradictory concept of the being implies the dialectical theory of truth which accepts the contradiction as the criterion of truth and the non-contradiction – as the criterion of falsity (*contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio falsi*). For Aristotle, a statement is true if it corresponds to the reality which Hegel defined as a dialectical transition from the thesis through the antithesis to the synthesis.³⁹ Therefore, apart from the dialectical process perceived as a whole there is no truth which reveals itself only within the dialectical nexus.

In addition to his holistic theory of truth Hegel discerned a relationship between the whole and the parts thereof.⁴⁰ Consequently, the whole consists of its parts which are determined by the whole

³⁷ Rosenkranz, "Habitationsdisputation am 27. August 1801," 158 [VI].

³⁸ Hegel, "Logik," 103 [§ 47].

³⁹ Rosenkranz, "Habitationsdisputation am 27. August 1801," 156 [I]; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik," in *Werke*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1833), 78-79 [I, I, I, C, 1]; Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik," in *Werke*, vol. 5 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1834), 274-78 [III, II, A].

⁴⁰ Hegel, "Logik," 104 [§ 52].

and which determine the whole. Similarly, Schleiermacher postulated the hermeneutical circle in which the whole and a part thereof interdependent so that the whole might be encompassed in light of its part and its part might be comprehended in view of the whole.⁴¹ The above thesis was a philosophical generalisation of the *Sola Scriptura* principle which indicates that the Scripture ought to be interpreted by the Scripture.

The dialectical process is composed of three phases (*Gestalten*) which are correlative not in chronological terms but in logical terms because the process takes place not in an ordinary (i.e. physical) time but beyond time namely in eternity. By virtue of the synecdoche it happened that Hegel used a name of a phase to describe the whole process. Additionally, many names were given to every phase so that actually the phases could be distinguished not by their names but rather by their position in the dialectical chain. In the Hegelianism three phases of the process entail three branches of the speculative philosophy⁴² and are parallel to three persons of the Trinity as reinterpreted by Hegel.⁴³

The first phase (called: idea, notion, God, Absolute, life or being [Sein]) is an undifferentiated being equalised with the nothingness.⁴⁴ This being defined as the perpetual becoming embarks on its dialectical voyage to know itself because the self-knowledge is

⁴¹ Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Hermeneutik," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. I/7, ed. Friedrich Lücke (Berlin: Reimer, 1838), 144-45 [II], 211 [II], 246-48 [II], 256 [II]; Schleiermacher, "Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. III/7, ed. Karl Lommatzsch (Berlin: Reimer, 1842), 231-35 [I, Vollkommenheit des Ganzen eines Kunstwerkes], 235-37 [I, Verhältnis des Ganzen zum Teil].

⁴² Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," 26-27 [§ 18]; Hegel, "Philosophische Enzyklopädie," 148 [§ 10].

⁴³ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12, 177-181 [III, C].

⁴⁴ Hegel, "Philosophische Enzyklopädie," 150 [§ 16]; Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik," 78-79 [I, I, I, C, 1].

inherent in the being. Consequently, to exist means to know oneself which is possible by the dialectical forms that the being assumes evolving into the ultimate phase (no. 3).

The transition from the first phase to the second phase occurs by the logical operation of negation (*Negation; Aufhebung*) which Hegel understood in a unique way.⁴⁵ He noticed that in German the verb *aufheben* (the same is true of its cognate *Aufhebung*) is an auto-antonym because it denotes either "to abolish" (*ein Ende machen*) or "to retain" (*aufbewahren; erhalten*)⁴⁶ similarly to the Latin verb *tollere* which signifies either "to elevate" or "to abrogate."⁴⁷

The Hegelian negation does not annul a previous phase but rather preserves it and advances by calling forth a new entity. Thus, the negation does not desolate the dialectical process but rather enriches it and expands into its climax. Analogically, the transition from the second phase to the third phase is brought about by the negation of the negation which does not restore what was previously negated (the phase no. 1) but rather adds the third entity to the preceding phases (no. 1 and no. 2) so that the mathematical logic $[-(-X) = X]$ must be suspended.

The negation externalises, specifies and divides the being, while the negation of the negation internalises it, generalises and unites. Since the being and the nothingness are united and dialectically identical, the becoming is a tension (*Unruhe*) and movement

⁴⁵ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Phänomenologie des Geistes," in *Werke*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1832), 84-87 [A, II]; Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik," 110-11 [I, I, I, C, 3, Anmerkung].

⁴⁶ Johann Christoph Adelung, *Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der hochdeutschen Mundart mit beständiger Vergleichung der übrigen Mundarten*, vol. 1, ed. Franz Xaver Schönberger and Dietrich Wilhelm Soltau (Wien: Anton Pichler, 1808), 498-99 [s. v. aufheben].

⁴⁷ Karl Ernst Georges, *Ausführliches lateinisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Hahn'sche Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1869), 1973-74 [s. v. tollō].

(*Bewegung*) between the being and the nothingness.⁴⁸ The emergence (*Entstehen*) means that the nothingness turns into the being, whereas the disappearance (*Vergehen*) implies that the being changes into the nothingness.⁴⁹

The second phase (termed: world, nature, cognition [Erkennen] or alterity [Anders-Sein]) emerges by the negation of the first one. It is differentiated and alienated from the primordial being (the phase no. 1). By virtue of the negation the original notion becomes alien to itself so that it might be mirrored in the world and thus might know itself by its dialectical form. To know oneself and to explicate oneself is the nature of the Absolute. Therefore, God mediates himself as the universe and as the world he becomes different to himself. God becomes subject to his own perception and gazes at himself from outside, as the other one (i.e. as the world).⁵⁰ For that reason, Hegel did not ascribe the term "God" only to the first phase but rather equalised it with the whole process. God is not "in the world" but rather "as the world" which is his other face. The Absolute is the unceasing movement within itself, the eternal transition between the phases.⁵¹

The third phase (depicted as the Spirit or the absolute idea) is generated by the negation of the negation. It is the very climax of the dialectical, non-recurring process, the ultimate fulfilment thereof. The primordial being, that as the universe becomes alien and external to itself, as the Spirit returns to itself and unites itself with itself. The Spirit is threefold in the sense that it manifests itself as subjective,

⁴⁸ Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," 171-77 [§ 88].

⁴⁹ Hegel, "Logik," 95 [§ 9]; Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik," 108-9 [I, I, I, C, 2].

⁵⁰ Hegel, "Religionslehre," in *Werke*, vol. 18, 75-76 [§ 76]; Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12, 151-52 [III, A].

⁵¹ Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 11, 122 [I, B, c]; Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12, 177-81 [III, C]; Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," 163 [§ 84].

objective (practical) and absolute. The subjective Spirit is embodied in man, the objective Spirit – in the social system, and the absolute Spirit – in arts, religion and philosophy. Although all these phenomena are destined for man, the Spirit explores itself by means of them. It can be said that the Spirit fathoms itself as man by the forms (pertinent to human life) which it assumes.

Hegel amplified the Kantian distinction between *Vernunft* (reason) and *Verstand* (common sense) according to which the former deals with the rational or moral cognition, whereas the latter – with the empirical perception.⁵² For Hegel, *Vernunft* explores the intangible, while *Verstand* is restricted to the tangible.⁵³ However, the Kantian *Vernunft* is an aptitude either logical (the pure reason) or ethical (the practical reason), whereas the Hegelian *Vernunft* is speculative because reason is acknowledged as the divine within man which reflects in itself the absolute laws of dialectics.⁵⁴ Since for Hegel the knowledge of the Absolute cannot be mediated by anything except the Absolute or the forms thereof, reason (*Vernunft*), which, as the divine within man, can mediate, discovers and perceives the divine ray permeating the universe. In Hegel's opinion, the knowledge, which man acquires, is eventually not his own but it is the mediated self-knowledge of the Absolute that in the form of man knows itself by its other dialectical forms. Furthermore, Hegel did not isolate the rationality from the reality, positing that all, that is real, is rational and all, that is rational, is real.⁵⁵

⁵² Kant, "Opus postumum," 142 [I, XI, 1].

⁵³ Hegel, "Religionslehre," 75 [§ 73-74].

⁵⁴ Hegel, "Phänomenologie des Geistes," 327 [BB, VI]; Hegel, "Religionslehre," 75 [§ 73-74]; Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," 388 [§ 214].

⁵⁵ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," in *Werke*, vol. 8 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1833), 17 [Vorrede]; cf. Immanuel Kant, *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik*, ed. Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölit (Erfurt: Keyser, 1821), 34 [1, Vom principio rationis sufficientis]: "Quidquid est, est rationatum."

Hegel's approach to the Scripture and the historical Christianity was dictated by the axioms of his philosophy.⁵⁶ He was not willing to support the Enlightenment paradigm which demanded logical or empirical verification of any statement. Although Kant introduced the concept of the moral legitimisation and applied it to his philosophy of religion, Hegel was not a partisan of such strategies for they might damage the foundations of his own system.

Therefore, not consenting to the Enlightenment criticism of the Scripture Hegel decided to separate his philosophy of religion from the Bible and the historical exposition of its basic doctrines. In his opinion, the speculative philosophy of religion could not be founded on the events reported by the Scripture for two reasons. Firstly, the historicity of them might be called in doubt. Secondly, a sensual history, even the true one, can establish no general, universal laws which must solely rely on the genuine, divine happening (*Geschichte*).⁵⁷ This happening is timeless (*zeitlos*) and is a mask of God as he eternally becomes. Despite sensual phenomena as the manifestation of the original notion attest the eternal, timeless laws of dialectics, the true philosophy cannot be based on historical events which are empirical, yet unique and unrepeatabe.⁵⁸

Although Hegel detached his philosophy of religion from the Scripture, he utilised certain biblical terms as illustrations of his dialectical axioms. For that purpose, he reinterpreted them ignoring their original context. Thus, the world's creation was expounded as the eternal self-manifestation of the being that creates itself by its

⁵⁶ Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 11, 3-44 [Einleitung].

⁵⁷ Hegel, "Philosophische Enzyklopädie," 204 [§ 207]; Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 11, 79-85 [I, B, b].

⁵⁸ Cf. the concept of idiographicity in the humanities. Wilhelm Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," in *Präludien: Aufsätze und Reden zur Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1907), 355-79.

own negation.⁵⁹ For Hegel, Christ's incarnation and death symbolise the alienation of the world from the primordial notion and his resurrection represents the cessation of the alienation (called the reconciliation).⁶⁰ In the Hegelianism the alienation is not related to sin and the termination thereof has nothing to do with the substitution for mankind's transgressions (*satisfactio vicaria*). The Hegelian alienation is an inevitable consequence of the becoming of the being and is determined by the laws of dialectics to the same extent as the abolition thereof.

Analogically, Hegel identified the persons of the Trinity with the phases of the dialectical process. As the Son the Father divides himself and as the Spirit the Godhead is reunited with itself. By inference, the Son is tantamount to the universe.⁶¹ This inescapable conclusion Hegel feared and tried to eschew because of a possible religious offence.⁶²

Hegel's attitude to the proofs of God's existence was ambiguous.⁶³ On the one hand, he did not espouse the Kantian criticism of cosmological and ontological proofs. On the other hand, he asserted that the world is the self-externalisation and self-explication of God so that no proofs would be necessary because the reality is an effluence of the Absolute and the very Godhead mediates itself as the universe in order to attain the self-knowledge. As Hegel noticed, the ontological

⁵⁹ Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12, 157-58 [III, A, 1]; Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes," in *Werke*, vol. 12, 312-13 [3. Vorlesung].

⁶⁰ Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12, 167-69 [III, A, 3].

⁶¹ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," 317-18 [§ 161]; Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," in *Werke*, vol. 7/2 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1845), 28-29 [§ 383], 449 [§ 566-567].

⁶² Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12, 207-9 [III, II, 2].

⁶³ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes," 291-483.

proof presupposes that the idea of God implies his existence which from the Hegelian point of view is a truism for the idea and the beings are the same.⁶⁴

V. Eriugena's and Spinoza's Impact

It transpires that Schelling and Hegel were indebted to Eriugena⁶⁵ albeit in different respects. Eriugena represented and advanced the ancient Neoplatonism particularly the legacy of Pseudo-Dionysius. In the tract *De divisione naturae* Eriugena claimed that God is a perpetual momentum which takes place within himself and by which everything (*omnia*) happens.⁶⁶ In this ceaseless internal impetus God fulfils everything and everything essentially originates from him. Arguing in favour of the dynamic concept of God Eriugena mentioned one of the ancient Greek etymologies of θεός.⁶⁷ According to Plato θεός derives from θέω (to run).⁶⁸ This etymology was adopted by Theophilus of Antioch who, in defiance of the Aristotelism, conceded that God is proactive.⁶⁹ Although Tertullian protested against this derivation,⁷⁰ the patristic theology ultimately certified it as permissible.⁷¹

⁶⁴ Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12, 169-77 [III, B].

⁶⁵ Philip Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, vol. 4 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 761-74 [§ 176].

⁶⁶ Joannes Scotus Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," in *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina*, vol. 122, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1865), 452-53 [I, 12].

⁶⁷ Eriugena remarked that θεός derives either from θέω (to run) or from θεωρέω (to observe).

⁶⁸ Plato, "Cratylus," in *Dialogi Selecti*, vol. 3, ed. Ludwig Friedrich Heindorf (Berlin: Nauck, 1806), 49-50 [§ 31, 397d].

⁶⁹ Theophilus Antiochenus, "Ad Autolyicum," in *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Graeca*, vol. 6, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1857), 1029-30 [I, 4].

⁷⁰ Tertullianus, "Ad nationes," in *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina*, vol. 1, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1879), 661-64 [II, 4].

⁷¹ Joannes Damascenus, "De fide orthodoxa," in *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Graeca*, vol. 94, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1864), 835-838 [I, IX]. John of Damascus listed θέω (to run), αἶθω (to burn) and θεάομαι (to behold) as possible etymologies of θεός.

Eriugena built an ontological schema in which God moves from himself, within himself and towards himself so that he is the beginning, the centre and the end of all divine movement. Pursuant to Eriugena's definition, the nature (φύσις, *natura*), which is *eo ipso* divine, embraces both all existence (*omnium quae sunt*) and all non-existence (*omnium quae non sunt*),⁷² and is simultaneously creating and created.⁷³ For him, the nothingness (*nihilum*) is a hidden, inaccessible dimension of the divinity.⁷⁴ In his opinion, the divine nature is divided into four types.⁷⁵ The first one is the nature which creates but is not created (no. 1), the second one is the nature which creates and is created (no. 2), the third one is the nature which does not create but is created (no. 3), and the fourth one is the nature which does not create and is not created (no. 4).

The nature no. 1 denotes God as an undifferentiated principle (*informe principium*), whereas the nature no. 4 – God as the fulfilment of his activity.⁷⁶ Thus, they mean one and the same being viewed on the one hand as the commencement of the divine movement (no. 1), on the other hand – as the terminus thereof (no. 4). The nature no. 2 denotes the realm of ideas called prototypes (πρωτότυπα) which reside in God, while the nature no. 3 – the material world formed in the image of the ideas. The nature no. 1 and the nature no. 4 are not distinct forms of God but rather the forms of human reason. Eriugena asserted that the distinction between the nature no. 1 and no. 4 originates not from an actual ontology but from human cognition which contemplates the divine nature as the source (no. 1) and as the climax (no. 4).

⁷² Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," 441 [I, 1].

⁷³ Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," 453-54 [I, 12].

⁷⁴ Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," 680-81 [III, 19].

⁷⁵ Probably Eriugena patterned his division on the concept of "unmoved mover" put forward by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* (XII).

⁷⁶ Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," 525-28 [II, 1-2].

Eriugena comprehended the properties of the natures no. 2 and no. 3 as well as the relationship between them in a manner typical of the Neoplatonism. He pointed out that the existence of the nature no. 2 is necessary because the pristine nature no. 1 could not interfere with the defiled nature no. 3. Therefore, the material world (no. 3) was fashioned by means of the ideas (no. 2). In his system, the primordial Godhead (no. 1) is unapproachable to such an extent that it is ignorant of its own existence (*divina ignorantia*).⁷⁷

Moreover, Eriugena emphasised that ultimately all corporeality and differentiation (no. 3) must fade away. This happens as the material world is reduced to its original causes (*primordiales causae*) which are the ideas (no. 2) which shaped it.⁷⁸ Thus, all being reverts to the divine nature which neither creates nor is created (no. 4), and all corporeality (including human body and sexual differentiation) expires by virtue of the universal transformation into the One (ἕνωσις). Although human body is dissolved, soul, which appertains to the ideal realm, returns to the divine nature by being absorbed into it (θέωσις).

In light of the Neoplatonic ontology Eriugena reinterpreted rudimentary concepts of the Christian theology. For him, sin and mortality were related to the ontological deficiency peculiar to the tangible (no. 3).⁷⁹ In his view, Christ was not a historical person but rather a symbol of the formation of the corporeal world (the incarnation) and of the return to the eternal refuge namely to the One (the crucifixion and the resurrection).⁸⁰

Hegel adopted the Eriugenian dynamic concept of the being, that differentiates itself, and the Eriugenian identity of the existence

⁷⁷ Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," 589-94 [II, 28].

⁷⁸ Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," 859-60 [IV, 26-27], 890-92 [V, 19], 1001-2 [IV, 38].

⁷⁹ Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," 807-8 [IV, 14].

⁸⁰ Eriugena, "De divisione naturae," 540-42 [II, 12-13], 910-916 [V, 25].

and non-existence. Nonetheless, for Hegel, to be means to know. Therefore, as the Absolute becomes, it knows itself. This self-knowledge Eriugena explicitly denied (*divina ignorantia*). In Hegel's system the world obtained the highest sanction as the other face of God which is never dismissed and which endures forever along with its corporeality. Old Schelling continued the paradigm of the return adhered to by Eriugena and claimed that the world, which originated from the space temporarily relinquished by God, returns to its implicit origin and finally melts into the Absolute.

It is assumed that Schelling and Hegel were influenced by the Spinozism. On the one hand, Schelling and Hegel⁸¹ definitely appreciated Spinoza's monism. On the other hand, their concept of the being was entirely dynamic, whereas the Spinozan view was static. For Hegel, the being eternally becomes, while for Spinoza, one and the same divine substance manifests itself (*exprimere*) as *res cogitans* and *res extensa*.⁸² In the Spinozism the noetic phenomena and the material phenomena are two modes (dispositions) of the same divine substance. Consequently, the twofold manifestation of the divine substance (equal to the twofold disposition thereof) is static and indicates no flow of the being.

Spinoza distinguished between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*.⁸³ The former denotes what is self-reliant (*quod in se est et per se concipitur*) namely those attributes of one and the same substance which manifest (*exprimere*) the eternal and infinite essence. The latter signifies what relies on God and what follows from the

⁸¹ Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie," in *Werke*, vol. 15 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1836), 368-411 [III, II, I, A, 2].

⁸² Benedictus de Spinoza, "Ethices," in *Opera quae supersunt omnia*, vol. 2, ed. Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus (Jena: In Bibliopolio Academico, 1803), 35-129 [I-II]. The category of *res cogitans - res extensa* comes from Descartes.

⁸³ Spinoza, "Ethices," 61-62 [I, XXIX].

necessity of God's nature. Thus, there is no processual transition from *natura naturans* to *natura naturata*.

VI. Conclusion

Schelling revived an old tale about the world which departed from God and which is to be plunged into the Absolute. This tale resounded in every school of the Neoplatonism through the ages. On the contrary, Hegel regained the world, securing the ontological status thereof.

Paradoxically, Schelling and Hegel shared similar eschatological views. For Schelling, human death is not a separation of the soul from the body but rather an essentification of man by which his essence (*das Wesen*) is conserved and his accidentalness (*das Zufällige*) perishes,⁸⁴ The process of the essentification, which Schelling compared to extracting juice, spiritualises (*vergeistigen*) and thus immaterialises man. Hegel maintained that man is immortal as far as he is a form of the Spirit.⁸⁵ In his opinion, by death human specificity is generalised and thus the transition from the nature to the Spirit comes about. Hegel explained death as a natural phenomenon unrelated to the original sin which for him was a timeless symbol of mankind that becomes morally conscious by knowing the difference between good and evil.

⁸⁴ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Zweiunddreissigste Vorlesung," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II/4, 206-27.

⁸⁵ Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," 395-96 [§ 222]; Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," in *Werke*, vol. 7/1 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1842), 691-96 [§ 375-376]; Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," 13-24 [§ 381]; Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik," 259-62 [III, I, C].

Hegel and Schelling evidently differed in the ontological circumscription of symbolic communication. In contradistinction to Hegel, Schelling did not confine a symbol to a bare sign but rather acknowledged that symbols might unfold a unity of the infinity and the finitude which is underlying the universe.⁸⁶ For Schelling, however, the relationship between the infinity and the finitude was asymmetric in the sense that the finitude encloses in itself a germ (*der Keim*) of the infinity but the infinity is devoid of the finitude. Therefore, Schelling expounded the symbol of the incarnation in terms of the deification (θεώσις) arguing that in the symbol of Christ the true infinity became finite in order to demonstrate the ultimate annihilation of the finitude.⁸⁷

Schelling considered the religious symbolism permanent, whereas Hegel hoped that the abstract (conceptual) language of the speculative philosophy might supersede symbols peculiar to the religion which for him was only a preparation for an unalloyed knowledge unveiled in his system.⁸⁸ Hegel's stance opened up new horizons for the comprehension of non-Christian religions. His denial of any futuristic and transcendent eschatology solidified into the plain universalism.

In Schelling's philosophy of revelation the world's status was temporary, while in the Hegelianism the dialectical process, which takes place beyond a physical time (i.e. in eternity), could not be exceeded. For Hegel, as the threefold Spirit brings itself to unity and completion, nothing more is to be expected because all reality is already at hand. Consequently, the world never perishes and there is no future except the present. The Absolute irrevocably transmutes into the universe.

⁸⁶ Schelling, "Philosophie der Kunst," 430-33 [§ 42], 455 [§ 55]; Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 1/5, 293-95 [8. Vorlesung].

⁸⁷ Schelling, "Philosophie der Kunst," 432 [§ 42].

⁸⁸ Hegel, "Philosophische Enzyklopädie," 205 [§ 208].

ABSTRACT

The present paper examines the relationship between the ontologies of old Schelling and of Hegel and their approach to the world. The Schellingian philosophy of revelation and the Hegelian system were scrutinised in view of the impact of Plato, Eriugena and Spinoza. It appears that old Schelling continued the paradigm of the world's departure from and return to the Absolute initiated by the Neoplatonism, whereas Hegel paved the way for a new circumscription of the universe which was determined by the laws of dialectics.

撮 要

本文探討老謝林（Schelling）和黑格爾（Hegel）的本體論和研究世界的方法有何關係。作者仔細地審視了謝林派哲學和黑格爾派系的啟示觀，看柏拉圖（Plato）、愛瑞傑納（Eriugena）和斯賓諾莎（Spinoza）對兩者的影響。研究發現老謝林似乎承繼了新柏拉圖主義的觀點，認為世界曾遠離又回歸到絕對者那裏，而黑格爾則為宇宙鋪設出一條新界線，是由辯證法則去決定的。