A Defense Of Compatibilism Of Divine Foreknowledge With Human Freedom - A Rebuttal Of William Hasker's Incompatibilist Argument Concerning Hard Fact/Soft Fact Distinction（上帝預知與人的自由的可兼容性之辯證──就哈斯克有關硬事實與軟事實差別的不相容理據之反駁） / 張國棟
撮要
多年以來，學者對上帝的預知和人的自由意志能否相容爭論不休，有過不少重要討論，本文作者為此作出研究。哈斯克(William Hasker)曾論證上帝的預知和人的自由意志是互不相容的，作者卻指哈斯克的論證難以叫人信服。哈斯克利用硬事實和軟事實的分別，重申其論據，可惜同樣不成功。由於宿命論在神學上並不可信，所以哈斯克的論證亦沒有結論。作者於是認為上帝的預知和人的自由意志的相容是不言而喻的。
ABSTRACT
The author surveys the major discussions on the compatibility of divine foreknowledge with human libertarian freedom. Then the author shows that an incompatibilist argument offered by William Hasker is unsuccessful. Hasker’s attempt to revive the argument by re-considering the hard fact and soft fact distinction fails, too. Due to the implausibility of theological fatalism, the incompatibilist argument being inconclusive. The author argues that it is prima facie justified to believe in the compatibility of divine foreknowledge with human libertarian freedom.
原載於《建道學刊》14期（2000年7月），頁49-66。
