本體與象徵──論田立克處理上帝知識的方法 / 楊慶球

撮要

本文處理田立克的兩個基本課題:本體論和象徵。本體論是對存有的理解,田氏認為這是認識上帝的入門。人的有限使人詰問存有的哲學問題。在討論存有問題之先,我們先討論田氏的關聯法。田氏所採用的方法是從上而下的,因為他認定上帝是絕對超越的,非人所能認知,所以一切宗教語言都是象徵。如果硬要把上帝當作經驗對象來討論,便會使上帝失去了神性的本質。

正如馬萊馬克一樣,田氏的目的是要避過康德對神學認知的批判。如果理性認知的範疇內不包含神學知識,則田氏的確可以透過象徵語言,從存有入手,建立宗教的知識論;可是,田氏對象徵語言的詮釋頗為主觀,結果存有(本體)控制了意義的界定,而且失去了客觀性。

 

ABSTRACT

This paper deals with two basic issues of Tillich’s knowledge of God, that is, ontology and symbol. Ontology or understanding the nature of being give access to the knowledge of God. Human beings philosophize because they are finite and are a mixture of being and non-being. Before we discuss the meaning of being, the method of correlation will be dealt with. We should start with the situation of human and the religious quest to investigate the way of understanding God. The quest which Tillich adopts is from “below.” For Tillich, God is absolutely transcendental. God is the “Ground of Being,” therefore no one can treat God as an object to be analyzed. That is why all language about “God” is symbolic. Tillich distinguishes between sign and symbol. Symbol participates in the object in which it denotes; sign does not. Religious languages are symbols which participate in the object. Tillich insists that this is the only way to prevent us from making God “demonic.”

In conclusion, we find that Tillich, as Schleiermacher, wants to free himself from the critique of Kant by building up a cognitive system which can save religious epistemology. Tillich replaces the scientific knowledge of God by introducing symbolic language, however, the interpretation of the religious language is subjective. Thus meaning is controlled by being (Ontology) and the objectivity of meaning is undermined.

原載於《建道學刊》6期(1996年7月),頁83-109。